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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK H. FULLMER,
DAVID H. FULLMER and
WILLARD L. FULLMER, /d/ba
FULLMER BROTHERS,
a Partnership,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.PACIFIC INDEMNITY
COMP ANY, a California
Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,
and

\

\

Case
No.10839

FRED A. MORETON & COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THIS COURT:
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The single issue before the Court is whether the defendant (Appellant), Pacific Indemnity Company, under
the terms of its insurance policy No. LAC-120924 (Com1

prehensive Liability Policy) (R. 6-17) has a duty to defend its insured, plaintiff (Respondent), Fullmer Brothers, in Civil No. 150734, Prudential Federal 8ari11gs &
Loa.n Association v. Fullmer Brothers, et al. (R-71)
The question of u:l1Pther Appellant, Pacific lndern.nity Compatny, is obligated to indemnify its ins11red
(Fullmer) is not before the Court.

DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, upon plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, supported by the
pleadings in this cas0 and the pleadings in Civil ~o.
150734, Appellant's Insurance Policy No. LAC-120924,
Affidavits, documentary evidc>nce and Memoranda of Authorities, ruled: The Appellant, Pacific Indemnity Company, is liable to the plaintiff (Fullmer) for their complete defense in Civil No. 150734 under its Comprehensive Liability Policy No. LAC-120924, on the ground that
the exclusionary provisions as related to the duty to
defend is unclear and ambiguous; that the policy requires
the insurer to defend even though the cause of action is
''groundless, false or fraudulent,'' and that therefore
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted. (R. 210-212)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association
(Owner) enter into a Cost-Plus-a-Fee Contract with Fullmer Brothers (Plaintiff) (Defendant's Ex. D-1) to construct the new Prudential Building at 115 South Main
2

Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Prudential required Fullmer to secure insurance to
protect Fullmer in the event the building should "collapse" (R-44, R-226), and (Defendant's Ex. D-1) and to
provide aggregate property damage coverage with $500,000.00 limits. Coverage to be maintained in force for 365
days after completion of job. Prudential and Fullmer submitted its insurance requirements for the construction
of the Prudential Building to the Appellant, Pacific Indemnity Company, through its agent, defendant, Fred A.
l\foreton & Company. Both plaintiff, Fullmer, and
Owner, Prudential, specified to Appellant, Pacific Indem11it~T Company:
''The exclusion fom coverage of the policy designed 'Explosion' (X), collapse (C) ... must he
eliminated from the coverage of the policy (R-226.
R-44, Appellant's Exhibit D-1, Page 5) ... and
the Contractor shall maintain such insurance as
will protect him ... from claims for damages to
property - any and all of which may arise out of
or result from Contractor's operations under this
contract, whether such operations be by himself
or by any subcontractor or any one directly or indirectly employed by either of them. This insurance shall be written for not less than any limits
of liability specified as part of this contract. Certificates of such insurance shall be filed with the
Owner and Architect." (Appellant's Exhibit D-1
under General Conditions, Page 6.)
Having received the inisurance specifications required for the construction of the Prudential Building,
Pacific Indemnity Company then issued its broad form
comprehensive liability policy No. LAC-120924 (R. 6).
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Appellant, Pacific Indemnity Company, admits luwing received these i11surance requirements for the Prudential Building because it supported its opposition to
plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment by offering in
evidence defendant's Exhibit D-1, containing the identical insurance specifications of the Owner and Fullmer
'
as shown in R. 44 and 45.
For reasons yet to be determined, defects were discovered in the large 80-ton girders after they were <>rected and placed in the Prudential Building some 100 feet in
the air. To mitigate damage to Prudential's propert~·
and possible injury and loss of life, emergency measures
were employed to prevent the building from collapsing.
After tension on the large girders was released they
were then repaired in the air at an alleged cost of $993,874.31, including $86,450.00 for loss of use. Prudential
filed suit against plaintiff, Fullmer; Subcontractor, Allen
Steel Company; and Architect, \Villiam Pereira & Associates, praying for judgment against these defendants
and asking for its costs and attorney's fees. This Ci,·il
Action No. 150734 was filed June 25, 1964, in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, and has since been expanded
to include as third-party defendants, United States Steel
Corporation, Nels P. Mettome, d/b/a N. P. Mettome,
Contractor, and George Brandow and Ray .Johnston,
d/b/a Brandow and Johnston. (United States Steel Corporation furnished the steel for the building; Mettome
erected the steel; and, Brandow and Johnston were the
engineers who designed the steel structure.) This case is
awaiting trial in the District Court of Salt Lake County.
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Fullmer Brothers tendered the defense of Civil No.
150734 to Appellant, Pacific Indemnity Company.
Pacific Indemnity Company, admits (1) having received timely notice of damage to the new Prudential
Building - the subject of the suit against its insured,
Fullmer; (2) having received copies of Summons and
Complaint and given an opportunity to defend its insured, Fullmer; and, (3) having refused to defend its
insured, Fullmer. (See paragraph 8 of Answer filed by
Pacific Indemnity Company) (R. 26).
Appellant, Pacific Indemnity Company, in its brief,
Pages 3, 4 and 5, sets out only some of the allegations of
Prudential's Complaint, obviously omitting Fullmer's
Answer, denying these said allegations, and excluding
the allegations of the various other parties to this civil
action involving third party claims, counterclaims and
cross-claims.
Appellant, at Pages 6 and 7 of its brief, sets forth the
Insuring Agreement of its policy and then proceeds to
hypothecate a theory which absolves Appellant from any
liability, predicated upon certain exclusionary clauses.
Whether there is or is not liability to indemnify Fullmer,
under the said policy is not at issue in the case before
this Court. The only issue involved is strictly the duty
to defend as determined from a reading of the policy.
Appellant itself would undoubtedly concede that the
present judgment should not be interpreted as an adjudication of the obligation to indemnify.
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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
FULLMER BROTHERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE SINGLE ISSUE
OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND THE PRUDENTIAL CASE, CIVIL NO. 150734.

POINT I
PLAINTIFF , FULLMER 'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY
GRANTED BECAUSE ONLY A QUESTION
OF LAW WAS AT ISSUE.
It is well settled that Summary Judgment is properly entered if there is no genuine issue of a material fact
to be tried. There is no issue of a material fact in this
case. See In re Williams' Estates, 10 U. (2d) 83, 348 P.
2d 683 (1960), for a statement of the proper test. The
only question submitted for decision was Appellant's
duty to defend its insured, Fullmer, in Civil No. 150734.
The definition and scope of Appellant's duty to defend
can only be ascertained from the language of Comprehensive Liability Policy No. LAC-120924, issued by Appellant to cover Fullmer 's operations in the construction
of the Prudential Building. Interpretation and meaning
of an insurance contract, like any other contract, is a
question of law for the Court. It is respectfully submitted
therefore, that if the law is on plaintiff's side, no error
was committed in granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R-188)
6

It is important to note again that the lower court did
not determine, nor was the issue before the court what
obligation, if any, Pacific Indemnity Company may ultimately have to indemnify plaintiff in the event Prude11tial Federal Savings & Loan Association is successful in
its suit against plaintiff, Fullmer.

POINT II.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY DOES
NOT CLEARLY DEFINE THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE TO
THE DUTY TO DEFEND. THIS AMBIGUITY
MUST BE CONSTRUED TO FAVOR RESPONDENT, FULLMER BROTHERS.
It is a basic legal principle that in the interpretation
of insurance contracts, all doubts as to meaning should
be resolved in favor of the insured and that any exception
to the insurer's performance of the basic underlying obligation, must be clearly and conspicuously stated so as
to clearly appraise the insured of its effect.

In a recent California Supreme Court case Gray v.
Zurich, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P. 2d 168, 171 (1966)
(full opinion at R-154-172) the insured filed a suit
against the insurer for failure to defend an action
brought by a third party against the insured. The third
party complaint alleged the insured had committed an
assault. The insurer premised its refusal to defend on
an exclusionary clause which excused its defense of an
action in which plaintiff alleged that the insured intentionally caused bodily injury. Justice Tobriner speaking for the Supreme Court said:
7

"Although Courts have long followed the basic preC'ept that they would look to the wordR of
the contract to find the meaning which tlw parties
expected from them - th0~r have also applied tlw
doctrine of the adhesion contract to insurance
policies, holding that in view of the disparate bargaining status of the parties we must ascertain
the meaning of the contract which the insured
would reasonably expect."
Likewise Dean Pound undertakes to provide the
rationale for the rule in the Spirit of Common Law
(1921) at page 29, he states that:
"Taking no account of legislatiYe (i.e., no11common law) limitations upon freedom of contract, in the purely judicial development of our
law we have taken the law of insurance practically
out of the category of contract, and we ha'lre
established that the duties of public service companies are not contractual, as the nineteenth century sought to make them, hut are instead relational; they do not flow from agreements which
the public servant may make as he chooses, they
flow from the calling in which he has engaged and
his consequent relation to the public.''

It appears that Courts for good reason are reluctant to enforce the terms of an exclusionary provision
against the insured unless the notice of noncoverage is
conspicuous, plain and clear.
Policies are prepared by the experts, they are highly
technical in their phraseology and often are veritahle
traps for the unwary.

It remains to test the policy and its exclusionary provision in the instant case in light of the adhesion prin8

ciple in order to determine ·whether Pacific Indemnity's
refusal is justified.
Under the insuring agreement, Pacific Indemnity
undertook two primary obligations: (R. 6-R. 7)
(1) "Coverage C - Property Damage Liabilit~'
- except automobile.
''To pay on behalf of the insured, all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated
to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of PROPERTY, including LOSS OF USE
THEREOF, caused by accl.dent. (emphasis
added)
(2) "Defense, settlement, supplementary payments with respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy, the company shall:
'' (a) Defend any suit against the insured, ALLEGING such injury ... or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, EVEN IF SUCH
SUIT IS GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR FRAUDULENT ... (emphasis added)
"(h) (2) Pay all expenses incurred by the
company, all costs taxed against the insured in
any such suit, and all interest accruing after entry of the judgment until the company has paid
or tendered or deposited in court such part of such
judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company's liability thereon."
The policy then provides for exclusions (a) through
(k). (R. 7) Property Damage Amendment No. 6 (R. 16)
provides that Exclusion (j) is replaced as follows:
"(j) under coverage C(l) to injury to or destruction of property owned or occupied hy or
9

rented to the insured, (2) to injury to or destruction of any goods, products or containers thereof
manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed or
premises alienated by the named insured out of
which the accident arises, (3) to injury to or destruction of property caused intentionally or
knowingly by or at the direction of the named
insured, ( 4) to injury to or destruction of property, the restoration, repair or replacement of
which has been made or is necessarv bv reason of
faulty workmanship thereon by o~ 01; behalf of
the insured, ( 5) to liability assumed by the insured under any contract with respect to damage
to property in the care, custody or control of the
insured, unless the insured would have been legally liable in the absence of such contract, ( 6)
to injury to or destruction of property in the car0,
custody or control of the insured for repair, storage, sale or safekeeping or as bailee, trustee or
agent or while being transported by or on behalf
of the insured, (7) to injury to or destruction of
property in the care, custody or control of the insured which is to be installed, erected or used in
construction by the insured, (8) to injury to or
destruction of that particular part of any property upon which operations are being performed
by or on behalf of the insured at the time of the
injury thereto or destruction thereof, arising out
of such operations, or (9) to liability assumed by
contract for penalties or liquidated damages arising out of an agreement to perform work or services, or, the liability of the insured for breach of
a contract, other than a warranty of goods or
products as defined under sub-section (f) of condition 3 of the policy." (See Plaintiff's Memorandum R-134 to 139.) (Note also that nowhere are
the words ''Contractor'' or ''Subcontractor''
mentioned in these exclusions.)
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At the very outset it should be noted that the policy
is entitled a Comprehensive Liability Policy, a designation which connotes general protection from alleged
property damage.
The Appellant then makes two promises:
( 1) "To pay on behalf of the insured, all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or
destruction of property, and
(2) "to defend any suit against the insured
alleging such injury even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.''
These promises, without further clarification certainly
would lead Fullmer Brothers to expect Pacific Indemnity
to defend it against suits seeking damages for injury and
or destruction of property. Indeed, the broad language of
these promises supports Fullmer's reasonable expectation that it purchased a legal defense for property damage claims made against it regardless of the merit of such
claims.
If the Insurer wanted to condition its defense by
saying what it now argues e. g. (that the duty to defend
arises only if the insurer is bound to indemnify the insured) it was free to so state when the policy was written.
However, as pointed out in Gray v. Zurich, cited supra,
this very contention creates a dilemma.
''No one can determine whether the third
party suit does or does not fall within the indemnification covering of the policy until the suit is
resolved ... The carrier's obligation to indemnify
inevitably will not be defined until the adjudication of the very action which it should have deJ1

fended. Hence the policy colltains its mYn seeds
of uncertainty; the insurer has helcl out a promise
that by its very nature is ambiguous .... The insured is unhappily surrounded by concentric circles of uncertainty; the first, the unascertainable
nature of the insurer's duty to defend; the second,
the unknown effect of the provision that the insurer must defend even a groundless, false or
fraudulent claim; the third, the uncertain extent
of indemnification coverage . . . . "
In the instant case, the determination of whether
Fullmer Brothers is liable for an;- property damage must
necessarily await final judgment in the Prudential action.
Appellant could have used language calculated to clarif:the perimeter of its duty to defend. It has failed to do
so. The omission clearly must be construed against the
Appellant, Pacific Indemnit;-. :'.\foreover, the pertinent
exclusionary clauses (j) (1) through (9) supra, are of no
value in determining what the irnmrer undertook in terms
of a promised defense.
From a reading of these exclusions, no reference is
found excluding defense and it is impossible to determine what the Appellant intended to exclude from
coverage. Did Pacific Indemnity Company intend
to exclude property damage to the whole building
including the nondefective parts or are the exclusions
limited to that particular property subject to repair and
restoration, e.g. the girders~ Appellant's attempt to
extend these exclusions to include the whole building, including the nondefective parts, on the theory that it is
property upon which the Respondent worked. This is an
unreasonable interpretation because in effect, it renders
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the policy illusory insofar as any property damage tn
the Prudential building is concerned. In any event, Appellant has failed to clarify the meaning of its exclusionary clauses. The resultant ambiguity must be settled in
fayor of Fullmer Brothers in vie'iv of the rule that ambiguity in insurance contracts is resolved in light most
fayorable to the insured.

POINT III.
EVEN IF THE COURT ACCEPTS APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE DUTY TO
DEFEND ARISES ONLY IF CIVIL NO. 150734
INVOLVES LIABILITY FOR WHICH THE
INSURER, PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMP ANY,
-WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INDEMNIFY
THE INSURED, THE COURT MUST STILL
FIND THAT APPELLANT IS AND WAS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO DEFEND I~ CIVIL NO. 150734.
Plaintiffs do not believe it necessary to burden this
Court with extensive citation of authority for the wellrecognized rule of law that an insurer's duty to defend
an action is measured in the first instance by the allegations of the third party pleadings, and if such pleadings
allege injury within the coverage of the policy, the insurer must def end irrespective of the insured 's ultimate
liability to the third party. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v.
Continental Casitalty Co., 59 N.E. 2d 199 (1945), Osborne
v. Security Insura1nce Co., 155 C.A. 2d 201, 318 P. 2d 94
(1957).
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In the case of Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty Com.pany,
135 C.A. 2d 245, 286 P. 2d 1000 (1955 ), the court held:
"Examination of the pleading reveals that it
does factually allege an accident though it does
not use the word. The draftsman of a complaint
against the insured is not interested in the question of coverage which later arises between insurer and insured. He chooses such theory as best
serves his purpose; if it be breach of contract
rather than negligent performance of contract, he
chooses the former; if it be negligence rather than
warranty he alleges negligence; if he happens to
choose warranty it may be an express one or one
implied. And when the question later arises under an insurance policy as to what the facts alleged in the complaint do spell, for instance,
whether they aver an accident - the complaint
must be taken by its four corners and the facts
arrayed in a complete pattern without regard to
niceties of pleading or differentiation between
different counts of a single complaint. And tlw
ultimate question is whether the facts alleged do
fairly apprise the insurer upon an occurrence
which, if his allegations are true, give rise to liability of insurer under the terms of the policy
... " (R-142)
Later, in the case of Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 178 F. 2d 750 (1949) Chief Judge Learned Hand
stated:
" ... the injured party might conceivably recover on a claim, which, as he had alleged it, was
outside the policy; but which, as it turned out, the
insurer was bound to pay. Such is the plasticit~·
of modern pleading that no one can be posifrn'
that that could not happen. In such a case, of
14

course, the insurer would not have to def end· yet
ev.en then, as soon as, during the course of the
trial, the changed character of the claim appeared,
we need not say that the insured might not insist
that the insurer take over the defense. When,
however, as here, the comvlaint comvrehends an
in.jury which may be toithin the POLICY, we hold
that the vromise to defend includes it (emphasis
ours) ... It follows that, if the plaintiff's complaint against the insured alleged facts which
would have supported a recovery covered by the
policy, it was the dutv of the defendant to u~der
take the defense until it could ronfine the claim
to a recovery that the policy did not rover; ... "
(R. 143)
In accord:

Greer-Robbins Co. v. Pacific Surety Co. 37 C.A.
540 174 P. 110;
Lamb v. Belt Casualty Co., 3 C.A. 2d 624, 40 P. 2d
311;
Remmer v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 140 C.A.
2d 84, 295 P. 2d 19, 50 A.L.R. 2d 458, 466.
In Karpe v. Great American Indemnity Co., 11
Cal. Cal. Rptr. 908 (1961), the District Court of Appeal acknowledged that the obligation to defend is indeed
broader than the obligation to indemnify. Accordingly,
it is not inconceivable that a carrier may be obligated to
defend an action and yet at the same time be absolved
from any responsibility to indemnify the insured against
a judgment resulting therefrom. Thus, the absence of
any evidence bearing upon a diminution in value of th>:
structure may ultimately excuse the carrier from a duty
15

to indemnify. However, conjecture as to outcome or the
evidence ·which may contribute thereto is no logical ba.,is
upon which the duty to defend can be avoided. Clearly,
the duty to defend Respondent exists irrespective of the
uncertainty as to outcome at time of trial (R. 143)
Prudential's Complaint against the insured alleged
in substance that Prudential suffered $86,450.00 as damages because of loss of use of said building; that the two
large girders erected in this unusual structure which
were designed to support the floors in the building were
defedive; and until repair and restoration could he 0ffected the entire structure suffered a diminution of value;
and that collapse of the said lmilding was a real thr0at.
(For a case involving threatened collapse See Morton v.
Great American Insurance, 419 P. 2d 239, N.M. Oct.1966.)
The exclusionary language contained in the polic:·
und0r consideration does not undertake the deletion of
any property damage resulting from loss of use, diminution in value or collapse. Moreover, any doubt as to
whether Prudential's pleadings bring the occurrence
within the terms of coverage must clearly be resoln~d i11
favor of the insured, Fullmer Brothers. Likewise, when
one of the grounds on which the action is based is "·ithin the policy, the obligation to defend comes to fruition
Ritthie v. Anchor Casualty Co., supra.; 7A A27plema11
Insurance Law and Practice, Section 4683 (et seq).

(R. 142.)
In this same vein, not only is a carrier obligated to
defend an action alleging a loss clearly within the terms
16

of the policy, but indeed the carrier is, and should lw,
obligated to defend if there is, potentially, a case within
the C'overage of the policy. Pow-Well Plumb,ing and JI cat
v. Merchants Mutual Gas. Co., 89 N.Y.S. 2d 469 (1949)
(cited with approval in Ritcher v. Anclzor Casualty Co.,
supra). William Blackfield, et al. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, 53 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Sept. 1966).
(R. 147)
The exclusionary language does not undertake anywhere to delete property damage accruing from loss of
use. Loss of use is specifically covered under Coverage
C. supra, and is alleged as damage in Prudential's pleadings. Therefore, under the rule that the insurer's duty
to def end is measured against the allegations of the third
party complaint, Appellant is under an obligation to defend Fullmer Brothers. Appellant was put on notice
that Prudential was alleging property damage in the
form of lost use.
Likewise, the exclusionary language fails to exrlude
diminution in the value of Prudential's building during
the period of remedial care. The distinction between
rlamages resulting from mere cost of repair and replacement and damages represented by diminution in value of
the building has clearly been recognized.
In Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company, 51 C. 2d 558, 334 P. 2d 881, (1959), plaintiff, a home-builder, purchased 760 doors from a door
manufacturer for installation in homes to be constructed
by plaintiff. Thereafter, numerous defects appeared in
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the doors. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer in the sum of
One Hundred rrhousand Dollars ($100,000.00). In a proceeding subsequently commenced against the manufacturer's insurance carrier judgment was entered in faYor
of plaintiff. The policy in issue was similar to Appellant's LAC-120924 and provided as follows:
''To pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become obligated to pay by
reason of the liability imposed upon him by law
or contract because of injury to or destruction of
property, including the loss of use thereof, caused
by accident.''
Under the exclusionary clause of the policy it provided that:
"This policy does not apply ...
( e) Under Coverage C, to injury to or destruction
of . . . .
(1) Any goods or products manufactured, sold,
handled, or distributed by the insured or work
completed by the insured out of which the accident
arises.''
Further, the Exclusion of Products Liability provided:

"It is agreed that the policy does not apply to:
(1) The handling or use of, the existence of any
condition in or a warranty of goods or products
... sold ... by the named insured ... occurring
after the insured has relinquished vossession
thereof to others .... ''

In disposing of the initial contention that no injrir~r
to or destruction of property had been caused by acci-
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dent, Justice Traynor speaking for the Court, quoted
with approval from Hauenstein v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W. 2d 122, 126:
''Accident, as a source and cause of damage
to property, within the terms of an accident policy, is an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned
happening or consequence from either a known
or unknown cause . . . .
''The door failures were unexpected, undesigned and unforeseen. They were not the result
of normal deterioration, hut occurred long hefore
an;r properly construrted door might be expected
to wear out or collapse ... it bears emphasis that
we are concerned, not with a series of imperceptihle events that finally culminated in a single tangible harm (cf., Ca;nadian Radium & Uranium
Corp. v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 342 Ill. App.
456, 97 N.E. 2d 132, 139-140), but with a series of
specific events each of which manifested itself at
an identifiable time and each of which caused identifiable harm at the time it occurred."
In the course of distinguishing between damage to or
destruction of the doors themselves as contrasted to any
diminution in value of the houses as an element of property damage, Justice Traynor stated:
"It is not disputed that injury to or destruction of the doors themselves was excluded by exclusion (e). Plaintiff contends, however, that
both the houses and its business were damaged by
the door failures. With respect to the houses its
position is supported by Hauenstein v. St. PaulMercury Indemnity Co., 242 Minn. 354 (65 N.W.
2d 122. In that case the insured sold defective
plaster that was used to plaster a house. The plaster shrank and cracked to such an extent that it
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was of no value and had to be removed so that the
walls and ceilings could be replastered with a different material. Injury to the plaster itself was
excluded from coverage. 'l1he Court held, however, that injury to the house had occurred and
was covered under a clause identical ·with Coverage C in the present case. 'No one can reasonably
contend that the application of a useless plaste.r
which has to be remo,·ecl before the walls can be
proper!:· replastered, does not lower the market
value of a building. Although the injury to tlw
walls and ceilings can be rectified by removal of
the defective plaster, neYertheless, the presence
of the defective plaster on the \Valls and ceilings
reduced the value of the building and constituhd
property damage. The measure of damages is the
diminution in the market value of the building, or
the cost of removing the defective plaster and restoring the building to its former condition, plus
any loss from deprfral of use, whichever is the
lesser.''
Again in commenting on the Hauenstein v. St. PaulMercury Indemnity Co., supra, case Justice Traynor noted that although the injury to the walls and ceilings
could be remedied nevertheless the presence of the defective plaster on the walls reduced the value of the
houses. Similarly, in the present case, although the injury to the building could be remedied, nevertheless, the
presence of the defective girders reduced the value of
the building and this diminution in value constitutes
property damage. Again as noted in the Geddes opinion,
the measure of damage is the diminution of the market
value of the building or the cost of removing the defective welds on the girders and replacing them plus the loss

20

of use of the building while the repairs are going on
whichever is lesser.
Close examination of the subject exclusionary clauses
discloses no mention of the type of property damage
known and described as "diminution of value," "loss of
use," or "collapse." If it was the intention of the Appellant to exclude this type of property damage as contrasted to property damage solely represented by the
cost of r<'pair or replacement, Appellant (Insurer) has
failed to state such an exclusion. Appellant's failure in
this regard must be resolved against it.
Finally, we are not concerned so much with what
occurrence or accident has taken place or what was required to correct it as we are with the types of damage
allegedly suffered by Prudential. Thus it should be noted that the cost of repairs as an item of damage exclud<>d
under the policy can also constitute a measure of damage
upon which an insured loss can be predicated. Admittedly
the distinction is fine but just such a feather edge distinction was spelled out by .Justice Traynor in Geddes,
supra.
In the more recent case of Bundy the same distinction is set out. Bundy Tithing Co. v. Royal Indemnity
ro., 298 Fed. 2d 151, 6th Circuit 1962. The insured in that
ease commenced an action against his products liability
insurer to recover the cost of settling and def ending certain claims against him because of failure of radiant
heating tubing in buildings constructed by the insur<>d.
Three lawsuits had been filed against the insured in
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( 'alifornia awl fin• ill :\! iC'hil..'.'<111 H'Pking r<'('!>\·ery for
dama~(·s to proJH'l°t.'> sustai11C'd h_,. J'(•ason of th0 <10fr<'ti\·p
t11hi11g-, inst;illPd as part of th<• hPati11g- systf'ms. Th!'
suits alk!!<>d lll'L'.'ligf'll<'(' in th<' marn1fad11rf' of th<' tuhi11~
or hrPa('h of ,,.a 1Tm1t>· or hot h as a rPs11lt of whid1 th"
tubing failP<l a11<1 l<•ak<><l. Tht> appli<·ahlt' poliry pro,·i<1<·d
for tht> 0xclusio11 of <111>· "i11.i11ri1 fn nr r/f'sfr11«fio11
a11.11
.r1nnrls or 11rnrl11ds 111a11ufacf11rrrl, solrl, hanrllrrl or rlis-

or

trilJl(fpr/ hy thr namrrl i11s11red or wnrk u1111plefrd 71.11 or
for f],,, 11a111erl i11s11rerl out of ll'hich the orrirlr11t arisl's."

(C'mphasis ours) The principal clamagP rlaimPd was fnr
th<> eost of r0mo,·al of thP eo1wrPtC' flooring in whirh tht>
dC'f Prti,·e tubing- had lwe>n imlwclcled a11<1 the> laying of
110w rorn·rC'tP i11 whirh to plarP JH'\Y tubing. As to this
the cle>fondm1t insuranre rarri<'r eontencled that the oH
ronrretC' had Hot lw011 damag<'d in any arrident arn1 that
m any en'11t liahilit~· was 0xelrnle>d un<lPr thr Pxrl11sin11
rla11sC'. TllC' Sixth Cirrnit Court of AppC'als said:
"In our opinio11, prope>rt>· was damaged h~· tlw
i11stallation of defertin' tnhing in a ra(liant heating systl'm whirh ra11sC'<l the system to fail and
h0romC' 11s0l0ss. A home>owner would np,·pr ha,·r
surh equipment installPd if he knew that it would
last only a n'ry short time>. ..\ home with a heati11g system whirh did not fnnrtion wouhl •·Prtainly
not ht• suitable for Ji,·ing qnarters in the wiutPrtime. ThP mnrkl't for its sale would he Rerionsly
afforted.
"The failure of tlw tnhing- in the heat in~ ~.\·:.;
tern in a relath·ely short time was unforesC'en, 11110x1wrted and nnintPrnh•d. Damage to th0 nroperty was tlwrefore cnn~er1 hy ar<'id0nt.''

c\ 11 <'H'll Il101'(' COlltC'mpornry C3S(' inYoJving the same'
i;;:-;11(' is Ricliler n11111es, !111-. ,._ r·1ulerwrifers at !Jowl's,
/,011rln11, 2:~8 Cal. App. 2d ;):12 (19h:J). (IIP1Hing- unani-

mously <lenied hy the Suprf'm<' Court of California,
1966.) There the plaintiff, a home' huilder, was sued hy
sen'ral home owners for damage's to their home's rC'sulting from the rupture and failure' of thC'ir radiant heating
s>·stems. The defendant, insurer, refusC'd to def end tlH'se
third party suits on the ground that they were excluded
nndC'r the terms of the policy. The rele,·ant exclusion
stakd: "THIS CERTIFICATE DOES NOT COVER
LIABILITY ... D - For claims made against the' assured - (1) For repairing or replacing any defective
product or products manufactured, sold or supplied hy
the' assured or any defective part or parts thereof not for
the cost of such repair or replacement or (2) For the
loss of use of any such defeetive product ... (3) For
damage to that particular part of any property upon
whieh the assured is or has been working caused hy the
faulty manner in which the work has been performed."
After stating that it is not concerned with the obligation to indemnify the court said:
''The duty to defend is much broader than the duty
to indemnify ... Where there is doubt as to whether the
duty to defend exists, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the insured and t1gainst the insurer." (RitchiP
,.. Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d. 245, 251 r286
P. 2d 1000]; Firemen's Fuud ln.~urance Cn. v. Cha.~son,
207 Cal. App. 2d 801, 805 (24 Cal. Rptr. 276] ).
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Justice Salsman goes on to state the rule that the
obligation to defend is measured by the pleadings and
then states :
[ 4a] The 21 plaintiffs who joined in the Mann
complaint each alleged that because of the negligently installed radiant heating system the market value of his home had been or would be impaired. This is an allegation of damage entireh·
unrelated to damage resulting from the cost of r~
pairs and replacement of the defective heating
system and hence is a claim for a loss or damage
covered by the insurance. [5] That diminution
in the market value of the claimants' homes because of the presence of the defective radiaoit heating system would be a proper measure of damages is supported by Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St.
P(};Ul Mercury Indemnity Co., 51 Cal.2d 558, 565
[334 P.2d 881], where the court quoted at length
and with approval from the case of Hauenstein v.
Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354 [65
N.W.2d 122]. In Hauenstein, defective plaster
had been applied to a building. The court noted
that the presence of the defective plaster on the
walls of the building constituted property damage, and declared: ''The measure of damages is
the diminution in the market value of the building,
or the cost of removing the defective plaster and
restoring the building to its former condition plus
any loss from deprival of use, whichever is the lesser." The plaintiffs named in the Mann complaint
also alleged damage to real property, improvements, appliances and furnishings. These are
clearly claims for damages that are separate and
distinct from any claim based upon the cost of repair or replacement of the defective heating system itself. Such claims are clearly within the co>·erage of appellant's policies.
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[ 4b] In like manner, each of the other complaints contains some allegation of damages unrelated to the cost of repair and replacement of
the defective heating system. Thus, some claim
structural damage to their houses, while others
allege a decrease in the value of their homes, or
claim damage to furniture, fixtures and appliances. All of these claims appear to come within
the coverage extended by the insurance and hence
the duty to defend is present. (Remmer v. Glens
Falls Indem. Co., supra, 140 Cal.App.2d 84; see
also Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 178 F.2d
750.) (Emphasis supplied)
(See full opinion of Eichler case at R. 96 et seq.) See
also Lowell v. Maryland Casualty, 419 P. 2d 180, California 1966.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the only question
before the lower court involved interpretation of an insurance contract (the duty to defend) and was, therefore,
ripe for summary judgment; that the policy is ambiguous and uncertain and must be construed to favor Respondent; that Prudential's complaint alleged property
damage outside the exclusionary provisions of the pol-
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icy and thus impels a defense by insurer; that the duty
to defend is greater than the duty to indemnify; that
"loss of use," "diminution of value" and "collapse"
were ·within the insuring agreements of the policy and not
excluded and therefore, the ruling of the lower court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
By ALLAN E. MECHAM
Attorneys for Respondents
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